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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
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In Communist Propaganda



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14 NOVEMBER 1973
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ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

MOSCOW HAS LITTLE COMMENT ON NEW EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT

Moscow has reacted to the six-point Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire stabilization arrangement, signed on 11 November, with the same caution which has been displayed in the face of past U.S.-initiated peace moves in the Middle East. The minimal followup comment on the agreement has deferred to Egyptian interpretation, a pattern consistent with Moscow's handling of the June 1970 U.S. initiative calling for a cease-fire and a resumption of the Jarring mission.

While TASS did not report the six points of the agreement until almost 24 hours after they had been made public on 9 November, this may well have stemmed from the confused sequence of reports from Cairo. Soviet media had displayed some concern to cite Cairo as the source of the details of the agreement. Most Soviet reportage, before and since the signing of the agreement, centered on alleged Israeli cease-fire violations and on Israeli obstruction of the UNEF functions.

In an effort to balance the U.S. initiative, Moscow has taken pains to play up Arab expressions of gratitude for its aid and support and has reiterated that such assistance would continue. Receiving the new Kuwaiti ambassador, Podgornyy declared, according to an Arabic-language broadcast on the 12th, that the USSR would continue its "active assistance" to secure a just peace and insure the security of all countries and peoples of the Middle East. Brezhnev referred to "effective support" for the Arabs provided by all socialist states in his 12 November speech in Kiev at a dinner for Yugoslavia's Tito. He otherwise mentioned the Middle East only in citing the war there and the Chilean situation as attempts by "imperialist reaction" to counteract the deepening of detente.

At the same time, TASS selectively quoted Secretary Kissinger to demonstrate that detente has not been affected by the Middle East crisis. In a brief 13 November report dailined New York on Kissinger's "interview with American television stations"--not identified as taking place in Peking--TASS featured his rejection of the idea that events in the Middle East "allegedly 'exposed the myth'" of Soviet-U.S. detente. The account summed up his remarks on the Arab-Israeli conflict in one paragraph, noting that U.S. goals were stabilization of the cease-fire and the

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holding of a peace conference. TASS added that Kissinger stressed, however, that the United States would continue unconditional support to Israel which was "allegedly necessary to guarantee Israel's 'existence.'" The dispatch concluded by reporting Kissinger as saying the Arab decision to limit oil production would not influence the U.S. position.

Follow-up to the 11 November agreement cited an Egyptian spokesman's explanation that it was a first practical step toward implementation of UN decisions providing for complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory. The spokesman was also quoted as saying the measures being taken are in preparation for a peace conference. Moscow has made a few other passing references to peace negotiations, and in one notable instance, a Volskiy article in NEW TIMES of 9 November, indicated that "most" of the Palestinian leaders did not object in principle to participation in peace talks.

REPORTS OF TASS' belated and confused handling of the six-
SIX POINTS point agreement, outlined by Secretary Kissinger
in a letter to UN Secretary General Waldheim
and made public on the 9th, may have been due to conflicting
reports from Cairo and uncertainty over Israeli acceptance.
Joint announcement of the agreement in Washington, Cairo and
Jerusalem was scheduled for 1700 GMT on the 9th. The announce-
ment actually came first from Washington an hour or so in
advance of the scheduled time. The agreement calls for Egyptian-
Israeli observance of the cease-fire; discussions to settle the
question of return to the 22 October positions "in the framework
of agreement on the disengagement and separation of forces"
under UN auspices; supplies to the town of Suez and evacuation
of wounded Suez citizens; no impediment to the movement of
nonmilitary supplies to the east bank of the canal; replacement
of Israeli checkpoints on the Cairo-Suez road by UN checkpoints,
with Israeli participation at the Suez end "to supervise the
nonmilitary nature of the cargo at the bank of the canal"; and
exchange of all prisoners of war "as soon as the UN checkpoints
are established."

+ The Israeli radio at 1800 GMT on the 9th carried the text of
the six points as officially announced in Washington; at 2300 GMT
the radio reported an Israeli cabinet announcement that the
government's position was "positive" regarding the signing of the
agreement, but that further contacts with the United States would
be held. A newscast at 1100 GMT on the 10th said the signing
would not take place that day since some points still "required
clarification." It was not until 1800 GMT on the 10th that
Mrs. Meir was reported as stating that authorization to sign the
agreement had been given.

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+ In Cairo, the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY (MENA) at 2010 GMT on the 9th incorrectly reported a set of four points said to have been agreed upon as a result of Secretary Kissinger's visit; this erroneous report was repeated by Cairo radio at 2100. But at 2225 GMT MENA carried the text of the actual six-point plan.

+ TASS in a dispatch from New York at 2208 GMT on the 9th reported that Kissinger had sent Waldheim a letter stating that during his consultations with Egyptian and Israeli representatives an "understanding" was reached on settling a number of matters pertaining to the cease-fire.

On the 10th at 1223 GMT a TASS multi-datelined item from Cairo, Washington and Paris juxtaposed the incorrect MENA report on a four-point agreement with the six-point "text of the agreement quoted in Kissinger's letter" to Waldheim. The latter was an accurate rendition except for the omission of one clause providing for Israeli participation in supervising the nonmilitary nature of the cargo at the Suez end of the Cairo-Suez road. TASS went on, under the Paris dateline, to point to discrepancies "noted here" between the Cairo and Washington versions.

While TASS thus failed to acknowledge the second, correct MENA report on the agreement, at 1528 GMT it killed the multi-datelined item incorporating the erroneous MENA report and substituted the text of the six points as "reported in the Cairo press." The overlooking of the correct MENA version is inexplicable, but it would seem that TASS, while it had a correct text in hand from Washington, was waiting to attribute it to an official Cairo source.

The confusion over the versions of the agreement and Egyptian-Israeli acceptance seems also to have been reflected in remarks by PRAVDA political observer Zhukov in his television program on the 10th. Excerpts of his TV remarks were broadcast by Moscow radio's domestic service at 1745 GMT, but according to Moscow's TV program schedule, his television appearance was some two hours earlier. Thus his statement would appear to have been prepared while there was still some doubt as to what set of points Cairo had actually accepted. Zhukov noted the Kissinger letter to Waldheim enumerating "several questions" connected with implementation of the cease-fire on which Kissinger "supposedly" reached agreement with Egypt and Israel. He went on to say that the Western press and radios had carried a host of reports on this matter, some of them contradictory, and added that it was his impression these reports should be treated "with utmost caution while waiting for the real state of events to be clarified."

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The signing of the agreement at 1300 GMT on the 11th was reported by Soviet media shortly thereafter--in an Arabic-language broadcast at 1730 GMT and by TASS at 1817 GMT. The TASS account referred to the signing of "a protocol on the observance of the cease-fire, ending of military operations, and the return of troops to positions they occupied on 22 October." This language paralleled to some extent the MENA announcement on the signing of the "UN document" concerning the cease-fire arrangement on the West bank "and the return of Israeli forces to their positions at the time of the cease-fire on 22 October."

PALESTINIAN
ROLE IN TALKS

The Volskiy article in NEW TIMES (No. 45, 9 November) for the first time broached the possibility of Palestinian participation in the peace talks called for in Security Council Resolution 338. In line with the USSR's previous caution vis-a-vis its relations with the Palestinian organizations, Moscow had ignored the flurry of reports in Arab media since the end of October that the Soviet Union, through its ambassador to Lebanon, had advised the Palestinians to be prepared to participate in a peace conference. According to Arab reports, Moscow also brought up with the Palestinians the question of formation of a Palestinian state and of a Palestinian government in exile.

Volskiy summed up the readiness or interest expressed by Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon in participating in peace talks, adding that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership was also discussing its attitude toward talks. He noted that PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat had held a series of conferences on this topic with leaders of various Palestinian organizations, and attributed to the Beirut paper AN-NAHAR the view that "most of them" did not object in principle to participating in such talks. Volskiy went on to observe that "despite certain shades of differences" between their positions, the leaders of the Arab countries and peoples were displaying a "constructive approach" to a just settlement of the conflict.

Other than a scattering of reports on fedayeen participation during the fighting, Soviet media have made few references to Palestinian activities. TASS did report from Beirut on 20 October a PLO Executive Committee session chaired by 'Arafat, noting that a PLO spokesman said results of the session would promote a stepup in Palestinian fighting against Israeli troops. TASS and Moscow's Arabic-language service on

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11 November and PRAVDA on the 12th reported 'Arafat's arrival in Cairo, the Arabic broadcast adding that he had previously visited other Arab capitals. For the past few days Arab media have carried a spate of rumors about an imminent visit to Moscow by a Palestinian delegation led by 'Arafat, along with reports of postponements and denials of such a visit. In light of past practice, Moscow would not be expected to give advance announcement of such a visit.

An 'Arafat message of congratulations to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman on the October Revolution was broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the 11th and published in PRAVDA the following day. 'Arafat praised the USSR's "firm support" for the Palestinians "national rights and legitimate aspirations" and referred to the "unlimited aid" given by the Soviet people to the Arab people in general and the Palestinian people in particular.

BACKGROUND ON
1970 INITIATIVE

The U.S. initiative of June 1970, which called for resumption of the Jarring mission and a cease-fire, was also handled by Moscow in a cautious fashion. Initial response to that move was largely confined to replays of Arab and West European assessments that the U.S. proposals contained nothing new. After President Nasir's acceptance of the U.S. initiative in his 23 July anniversary speech--somewhat belatedly noted by TASS--Moscow comment repeated Nasir's argument that the U.S. plan did not differ from Security Council Resolution 242. Moscow did not specifically address itself to the substance: while it did endorse resumption of the Jarring mission, references to a cease-fire were infrequent and imprecise. Soviet media did attempt to bolster Nasir in the face of Arab criticism of his acceptance of the U.S. initiative and accusations of a sellout on the Palestinian issue. Coordinated Egyptian, Israeli, and U.S. announcements of a cease-fire effective August 7 were promptly reported by TASS in a brief triple-dated item, and Moscow began crediting the agreement to an "Egyptian peace initiative."

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EAST - WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW DEPICTS DEEPENING WORLD CRISIS OVER OIL CUTBACKS

The Arabs' oil squeeze on the West and the efforts by the Western countries to deal with the crisis have been a constant though subordinate focus of Soviet news reporting since the beginning of the recent Middle Eastern fighting. Relying mainly on foreign news reports and keeping self-initiated comment to a minimum, Moscow has presented a picture of deepening crisis in the West brought about both by the imminence of severe oil shortages and by the inability of the oil-consuming countries to devise an effective common policy. The disruptive impact of the crisis on Western alliance relationships has been particularly noted. While Moscow has assumed an air of detachment in reporting these developments, it has taken care to remind the West of its own oil resources and to hint at the prospective advantages of commercial arrangements for exploiting these resources.

WESTERN DISCORD Moscow has shown ill-concealed relish in reporting signs of discord in the West provoked by the Arab oil squeeze. This was a major element in its interpretation of the rift between the United States and its NATO allies at the end of October. Moscow repeatedly pointed out at that time that the resistance of the FRG and other NATO countries to the U.S. supply of war materials to Israel was prompted by a self-interested concern to avoid Arab retaliation. More recently, it has reported in minute detail measures adopted or suggested by various Western countries which reflect a differentiated response to the oil embargo. It has noted, for example, the decision of a Japanese oil company to stop oil supplies to the U.S. armed forces, and it has reported a suggestion by Denmark that NATO forces participating in a current military exercise bring their own fuel.

Moscow's main exhibit in this line of reporting was the resolution adopted by EEC foreign ministers at their meeting in Brussels on 6 November. Widely regarded in the West as at best a stopgap declaration designed to reassure the Arabs regarding Europe's interest in a "just" Middle East settlement, the resolution has been presented by Moscow as an example of European faint-heartedness. Accurately

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anticipating the tone of the resolution, a PRAVDA commentary on 6 November reported that the EEC members were showing little enthusiasm for a Netherlands' proposal to pool the oil stocks of the member countries for future rationing according to need. Quoting the London TIMES, it observed that the attitudes of the European countries proved once again that at a time of trial for the rival partners of the Common Market "charity begins at home."

A TASS report on the resolution the next day expanded on this theme. Noting that the ministers evaded an answer to the Dutch proposal, it observed that the "partners of Holland clearly could not bring themselves to come out in her support for fear it would lead to an extension of the Arab boycott to other countries of the European Economic Community." Neither in this report nor in others has Moscow referred to reports, noted in the Western press, that the EEC declaration was influenced by tacit assurances, conveyed through the French, that Europe, including the Dutch, would not lack for oil. Nor has it noted that the Netherlands, as a member of the "Nine," participated in formulating the EEC resolution.

SOVIET OIL RESOURCES Moscow has taken pains to emphasize the contrast between the West's straitened circumstances and its own favored situation with respect to oil resources. It has suggested, moreover, that the West might find a solution to its energy problems by taking advantage of the offers of improved trade relations that the Soviet Union has extended. In a discussion program beamed to North America on 4 November, for example, one commentator asserted that the Soviet Union's energy resources could "contribute most decisively to taking the edge off the American energy crisis." He went on to quote a Soviet scientist as saying that the day might come "when cold Siberia will light and heat New York." Another commentary beamed to North America on 13 November described with approval the interest being shown by many American companies in joint arrangements for developing Soviet energy resources.

The Soviets have also conveyed more specific assurances along this line to other countries victimized by the oil squeeze. In an interview with DER SPIEGEL on 12 November, CPSU Western affairs expert Vadim Zagladin responded to a question whether the FRG could get energy from the Soviet Union in the event of shortages produced by the Arab embargo, by saying that such an opportunity existed and, indeed, was

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already being implemented. He insisted, under close questioning, that the FRG could rely on any commitments the Soviet Union made to supply energy in the future. These topics were apparently discussed by FRG Foreign Minister Scheel and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during the former's visit to Moscow at the beginning of November. According to a DPA report on 2 November, Gromyko assured his visitor that the Soviet Union would "favorably examine" the questions of Soviet deliveries of oil and natural gas to the FRG. Tokyo sources have also reported that the Soviet Union has decided to increase oil supplies to Japan, although no Soviet confirmation of the decision has been published.

In the meantime, indications have begun to emerge in Eastern Europe that the Soviet bloc has not escaped entirely unscathed from the Arab cutbacks of oil production. On 8 November the Moscow domestic service reported in a seemingly gratuitous reassurance that the supply of oil to Soviet refineries from the CEMA countries was proceeding without interruption and "in complete accordance with the plans." On 13 November, AGERPRESS reported that the Romanian party central committee had adopted a number of measures aimed at conserving energy resources. The text of the Romanian decisions published the next day showed that the measures included such stringent economies as cutting down on highway speed limits and reducing the consumption of fuel for heating. No explanation of these events has been provided by Soviet bloc sources.

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MOSCOW, EAST EUROPE DIVERGE ON TREATMENT OF WATERGATE

After displaying its pique over the U.S. military alert by linking it to Watergate, Moscow has returned to a posture of implicit support for the President's position. As in the past, Moscow's views have been conveyed through selective reporting of U.S. developments rather than by direct comment.

Remarks by Commerce Secretary Dent published in the central press on 12 November under a New York dateline featured his statement that the attacks on the President are "a scandalous campaign . . . causing great damage to the country." The TASS dispatch quoted Dent's characterization of those calling for the President's removal from office as a "vindictive and irresponsible group" representing "only a few members of Congress." The dispatch on Dent's remarks was a tribute to TASS's diligence as well as a measure of Moscow's sympathies, as the speech had been delivered on the 8th to a Chamber of Commerce group in Montgomery, Alabama and had not received wide publicity in the United States. A subsequent report on Moscow domestic radio on 13 November, carried in the press the following day, highlighted the President's latest statement of his willingness to turn over to the courts "all material requested." It cited the assessment of "American political observers" that the President's statement was motivated by a desire to dispel "doubts" aroused by Watergate and "the press campaign against the government."

Moscow's subtle support for the President stands in marked contrast to the positions of some of its East European allies. While most Warsaw Pact countries have maintained a virtual blackout on Watergate, Prague and Budapest have underscored the seriousness of the Presidential crisis. Czechoslovak comment has treated the crisis in conventional ideological terms as symptomatic of fundamental defects in the U.S. political system and has relied largely on replays of U.S. press and public criticism of the President. By contrast, Budapest has registered direct criticism of the President. For example, MAGYAR NEMZET's Washington correspondent, in a dispatch carried on the 10th, observed that "only a miracle" could save the President, and he completely absolved the Democrats in Congress of scheming to replace the President by a member of their own party. Budapest comment on the President's energy speech likewise scored his "unjustified dramatization" of the energy crisis as an attempt to "save his Presidency."

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

KISSINGER COVERAGE REFLECTS PROGRESS IN BILATERAL RELATIONS

The 14 November joint communique marking Secretary Kissinger's 10-14 November visit to Peking maintained the forward momentum in Sino-U.S. relations while refining bilateral positions on the crucial Taiwan issue. This represents the first such treatment of the obstructive Taiwan problem since the 28 February 1972 Shanghai communique following President Nixon's visit. Notably omitted from the current communique was all reference to U.S. forces in Taiwan, which the Chinese side had pointed to in the Shanghai communique as part of the Taiwan question. In contrast to their previous detailed treatment, the Chinese this time briefly stated that the normalization of relations can be realized only on the basis of "confirming" the principle of one China. The U.S. side reaffirmed its previous stance that it "does not challenge" the position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

The communique characterized the talks Kissinger had with Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials as "frank and serious," a formulation similar to the "earnest, frank and constructive" talks noted in previous visits. However, Peking this time carefully balanced the formula by noting that the Secretary had a "friendly" conversation with Mao, and by reporting for the first time in such a statement that in Mao's talks with Kissinger, Mao and President Nixon had conveyed mutual regards.

The two sides broadened the scope of their original Shanghai communique commitment to oppose "hegemony" in the Asia and Pacific region, adding now "in any other part of the world," and reiterated their previous agreement to settle differences without resorting to the threat or use of force. Reflecting the "good progress" made in lower-level consultations during the visit, the sides agreed that the responsibilities of the liaison offices should be expanded, noted that agreement was reached on a number of bilateral exchanges and held that conditions should be created for further development of trade. Both noted the "particular importance" of "frequent contact at the authoritative level" and duly affirmed bilateral determination to normalize relations.

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Peking's general treatment of the Secretary's visit also suggested progress in Sino-U.S. relations by offering measurably more forthcoming coverage than during his previous stays. Most notably, NCNA's account of Kissinger's 12 November visit with Mao characterized it as a conversation "on a wide range of subjects in a friendly atmosphere," in contrast to the description in February 1973 of "a frank and wide-ranging conversation." NCNA repeated Mao's expression of regards to President Nixon in the same terms used last February, but added that the Chairman this time "expressed welcome" to Secretary Kissinger. The members of the Chinese delegation at the meeting were the same as last February, with the addition of Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, who presumably attended in recognition of Kissinger's new status as secretary of state. Absent from the session was party Vice Chairman Wang Hung-wen, who has attended every other publicized Mao meeting with a foreign visitor since the 10th CCP Congress last August.

NCNA coverage of previous Kissinger visits had been limited to brief, straightforward reports of his meetings and receptions with Chou and other Chinese officials, but Peking this time, perhaps reflecting his new official status, gave the Secretary treatment approximating that for a visiting foreign minister of a country having diplomatic relations with Peking. NCNA reported a welcoming banquet hosted by Chi Peng-fei and attended by Chou and party Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying on the 10th, noting the toasts by the two foreign ministers, and also reported Kissinger's reciprocal banquet on the 13th. In his remarks on the 10th, Chi briefly touched on Peking's current sanguine view of the international scene and offered the most positive Chinese assessment of Sino-U.S. relations to date.

While noting continued Sino-U.S. differences, Chi favorably reviewed developments since President Nixon's visit, affirming that "a good start" had been made and that the goal of normalized relations can be achieved. In his similarly forthcoming remarks on the 13th, Chi underlined evidence of Chinese support for President Nixon by formally proposing a toast to the health of the U.S. leader.

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INDOCHINA

GVN AIR STRIKES, ALLEGED U.S. FLIGHTS OVER DRV DRAW PROTESTS

The 7 November air attacks by the GVN and the alleged U.S. air reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam on the 8th have drawn a welter of protest from communist propaganda culminating in PRG and DRV government statements decrying "intensified war acts" by the United States and Saigon. In a somewhat more conciliatory vein, the head of the PRG military delegation to the Joint Military Commission has put forth a five-point proposal for observance of the cease-fire, and a low-level LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY article has called for a new four-party meeting in Paris as a possible solution to the current military impasse in South Vietnam.

GVN AIR ATTACKS Within an hour of the 7 November GVN bombing of Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province and Bu Dop in Phuoc Long Province, Liberation Radio was telling its listeners that the GVN aircraft had killed many civilians and destroyed many homes and other property; followup reports the same day described the action as a "new, extremely grave act of war" and a "new, extremely barbarous criminal act" by Saigon. Reflecting similar stridency and automatically accusing the United States of complicity, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary published the day after the bombings said they constituted a "frenzied war crime and a very serious new military adventure of the United States and its lackeys." The commentary maintained that, although Saigon, "incited and assisted" by the United States, has been sabotaging the Paris agreement for the past nine months, since mid-October the "tempo" of its "nibbling, bombing, and shelling operations has increased markedly" and the latest bombings have "escalated its war crimes to a high degree." Responding to the current situation by invoking the 15 October order of the South Vietnamese liberation army, the commentary asserted that "our compatriots and combatants are determined to counterattack all acts of war by the United States and its lackeys in all places and in appropriate form with appropriate force." In a concluding threat, it speculated that the "warlike clique has not learned its lesson from the counterblows in Chu Nghe [Le Minh], Thanh Duc, Bach Ma, Bu Bong, and Bien Hoa."

A NHAN DAN commentary on the bombings, also broadcast on the 8th, gave vent to an equally strong outburst, terming the attacks by

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the Saigon air force "the most serious act of war by the United States and the Saigon Administration since 28 January." Buttrussing the repeated communist contention that the United States is responsible for calling the shots in South Vietnam and is anxious to resume the role of "international gendarme," the same commentary claimed that: "Kissinger on 3 November ordered the Pentagon and the State Department to closely watch what he called North Vietnam's strengthening of its military forces in South Vietnam. He also said menacingly that the fact that Nixon ordered all U.S. armed forces to be placed on alert during the Mideast crisis proves that the United States will not sit with folded arms."

ALLEGED U.S. OVERFLIGHTS The DRV response to alleged U.S. air reconnaissance over North Vietnam was routine and relatively mild, considering that the intrusions supposedly took place over the heartland of North Vietnam. The 8 November foreign ministry spokesman statement charging the flights is the fourth such protest since the signing in Paris of the 13 June joint communique which explicitly prohibits such flights. Although the three earlier protests cited alleged flights only over coastal provinces, while the current statement claims intrusions over a "number of localities, including Hanoi and Haiphong," all of Hanoi's protests on overflights have been issued at the same level of authority and have been consistent in their language. The current protest marks the first time Hanoi has charged U.S. overflights of its interior since last April, when the United States acknowledged that flights had occurred on the 19th and 24th.

Although the January Paris agreement does not explicitly ban such flights, Hanoi has construed Article 2, which calls for a termination of all military activities by the United States against the DRV, as encompassing reconnaissance. Thus, the current protest says the U.S. action "blatantly violates" Article 2 of the Paris agreement and Point one of the 13 June communique. (Point one of the 13 June joint communique states that "the United States shall cease immediately, completely, and indefinitely aerial reconnaissance over the territory of the DRV.")

PRG, DRV GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS The latest round of communist complaints over Saigon air attacks and alleged U.S. aerial reconnaissance reached a climax with the release of PRG and DRV government statements on 9 and 10 November, respectively. Although issued at a highly

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authoritative level, both statements were restrained when compared with the initial propaganda reaction to the air attacks. The PRG statement opened with a perfunctory indictment of the United States for its continued "military involvement and interference" in the internal affairs of South Vietnam and of the GVN's "nibbling operations," "brutal persecution" of people under its control, and "insolently provocative attitude" said to have caused a stalemate in the Joint Military Commission and the Paris consultative conference. The 7 November air raids, however, are characterized only as "more serious still" and as evidence of U.S. and Saigon attempts to "do away with the revolutionary achievements of the South Vietnamese people, and negate the revolutionary administration, the liberation armed forces, and the zone of control of the PRG in South Vietnam."

After leading off with an affirmation of the DRV and PRG's good faith in implementing the Paris agreement, the DRV statement closely paralleled the PRG's presentation, charging illegal U.S. interference in the South and Saigon "sabotage of the cease-fire," and labeling the 7 November bombings "particularly serious." Unlike the PRG statement, it went on to repeat allegations that U.S. reconnaissance planes intruded into DRV territory and the standard complaints that the United States has "refused to carry out its obligation to contribute to the healing of the wounds of war and the post-war reconstruction of the DRV." It underlined its accusation with the claim that the United States and Saigon "are the only cause of the aggravating tension now obtaining in South Vietnam."

Although Hanoi and the PRG have on two occasions since 28 January used the vehicle of government statements to protest what they consider to be U.S. and Saigon cease-fire violations, the previous statements--issued at the end of February and March--were in effect recapitulations of alleged violations that occurred during the first and second months of the cease-fire and were not pegged to specific incidents as the current ones were. During the war, such high-level official reaction was usually prompted either by actions that the communists regarded as unusually serious or as reflecting a major change in U.S. policy.

FIVE-POINT PROPOSAL

In the midst of the many protests flooding communist media in reaction to the air attacks, Liberation Radio on 8 November broadcast a note dated the 6th from the head of the PRG's JMC delegation to his Saigon counterpart, suggesting an immediate in-place cease-fire.

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The note detailed cease-fire violations allegedly committed by Saigon from 28 January to late October, vowed that further encroachments into the "liberated area" would be defended in accordance with the 15 October PLAF command order, pledged that the PRG would do "its utmost" to implement the Paris agreement, and set forth a "five-point initiative for the observance of the cease-fire."

In elaborating on how best to implement a cease-fire, the note asked that "all deployment and use of reserve support forces (artillery, armor and air forces) in places of conflict" be prohibited and urged that "both parties" immediately order commanders at various echelons to meet and discuss measures to end and prevent conflict. Without details, it went on to advocate the strict implementation of articles two and three of the protocol to the January peace accord concerning cease-fire--articles which it noted had been incorporated in their entirety into the 13 June joint communique. The fourth point of the note proposed that joint teams be dispatched to places of conflict, and the fifth and final point called for "nibbling forces" to be withdrawn to positions held prior to 28 January and for areas of control to be designated.

The PRG's motivation in offering this new cease-fire proposal is unclear since it in essence restates the main points of the January cease-fire protocol and the 13 June joint communique. The only known explicit mention of the proposal in follow-up propaganda came in a 10 November NHAN DAN editorial pegged to the PRG government statement. The editorial cloaked the five-point proposal in a mantle of some authority by linking it with previous PRG proposals made at the higher-level GVN-PRG consultative meetings* in Paris--namely, the 25 April six-point proposal setting forth the PRG program for settling outstanding problems existing between the two parties; the 28 June statement amplifying upon the 25 April proposal; and an 18 July proposal on ensuring the democratic liberties in the South.

FOUR-PARTY TALKS A commentary, transmitted by the PRG news agency LPA on 11 November, departed from the standard communist propaganda line by raising the question of resuming four-party talks in Paris. After a rambling criticism of the United States for continued involvement in

* Saigon's refusal to meet with the PRG because of their recent military operations in the South has resulted in the Paris meetings not being convened since 25 October when the 29th session was held.

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South Vietnam in violation of the terms of the Paris agreement, the commentator gratuitously called for a new quadrapartite Paris meeting because of the "grave situation" created by continued U.S. military commitment to Saigon.

The commentary concluded by warning President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger against disregarding "various agreement with Vietnam." In a gratuitous allusion to the Secretary's trip to Hanoi last February, it said that such disregard for treaties is not in accord with his attention to a Vietnamese poem "which impressed him" during his visit to Hanoi's historical museum:

Over the mountains and rivers of the South
rules the emperor of the South,
As fated in the book of heaven,
Oh you, barbarians who dared invade our land,
You will be wiped out, without mercy.

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RGNU MINISTRIES TRANSFERRED, IENG SARY LEAVES FOR CAMBODIA

Coincident with the 20th anniversary of Cambodian independence on 9 November, the insurgents' front (FUNK) and government (RGNU) took a dramatic step to improve upon their international image as a government in exile by announcing the transfer to the Cambodian "liberated zone" of the many RGNU ministries that had been based in Peking and elsewhere abroad. At the same time, FUNK "special envoy" Ieng Sary has ended his stint of more than 2 years in Peking as official liaison between FUNK representatives in Cambodia and those in China and departed for Cambodia via Hanoi on the 9th. These two developments appeared to underline the gradual public shift in power within the Front over the past three years--away from Prince Sihanouk's entourage in Peking to the Khmer Rouge insurgent leaders in Cambodia led by Khieu Samphan. Transfer of the ministries will also presumably strengthen the RGNU's domestic political apparatus at a time when the insurgent leaders have been calling for a "decisive" offensive to seize power. Prince Sihanouk has remained out of public view since receiving his mother in Canton on 3 November, and thus far has not officially reacted to the recent developments.

Front comment on the Cambodian National Day anniversary has reiterated the insurgents' commitment to a dry season offensive and opposition to negotiations; Peking and Hanoi comment continues to reflect their more moderate postures of recent months.

MINISTRIES' SHIFT The 9 November communique from the RGNU Prime Minister's office announcing the transfer of the ministries to Cambodia was reported by the insurgent news agency AKI and NCNA. Claiming that the Cambodian struggle "has reached its final phase" that will lead "irreversibly to total victory," the communique reported that the decision to transfer the ministries had been made, "with the agreement of...head of state" Sihanouk and RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, so that the RGNU will be "entirely installed in Cambodia," where it will exercise "full and entire authority." The communique linked the announced government shift with a firm reaffirmation of the current hard Front line on a settlement, asserting that the insurgents will continue, "with neither compromise nor retreat, the sacred fight" until Sihanouk's five points are achieved.

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SIHANOUK SILENCE Prince Sihanouk continues to be officially quiescent. He did not return to Peking for farewell celebrations for Ieng Sary--an absence perhaps related to the expected arrival in the capital of Secretary Kissinger on the 10th, and he was not reported to have celebrated the Cambodian anniversary on the 9th. Last year Sihanouk noted the date during his tour of North Korea at a reception hosted by a DPRK vice premier, and in 1971 and 1970 he spoke at celebrations in Peking attended by Chou En-lai. His only notable recent official statement was a 4 November message routinely thanking the Front's chief in Cambodia, Khieu Samphan, for his birthday greetings last month, and duly paying tribute to the Interior minister's announced resolve to fight "without the spirit of retreat or compromise."

IENG SARY TRIP NCNA noted on the 9th that a high-level Chinese leadership group led by Chou En-lai gave a farewell banquet for Sary on the 6th, and that he was seen off by party Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying on the 9th. NCNA on the 8th reported that RGNU Foreign Minister Sarin Chhak gave a reception for Sary that evening, "in the name of" RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth, that was attended by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Neither report characterized the atmosphere at the celebrations nor reported on speeches by either side.

VNA promptly reported Sary's arrival in Hanoi on the 9th, disclosing like Peking that he was "on his way home." Foreign Minister Trinh welcomed him at the airport and gave a reception in his honor that evening which VNA said took place in an "atmosphere of warm friendship and close solidarity." Pham Van Dong received Sary on the 12th in an atmosphere of "close solidarity and fraternal friendship." According to VNA, Dong offered to "fully support" the Cambodian struggle, while Sary conveyed "heartfelt greetings" to the DRV leaders from Sihanouk and Penn Nouth and reaffirmed Vietnamese-Cambodian solidarity.

Sary was accompanied to the DRV by two RGNU ministers who are responsible for insurgent military supply and coordination, suggesting that DRV support for the coming dry season offensive may have been discussed. One of the RGNU officials, Minister of Military Equipment and Armament Duong Sam Ol, also visited Hanoi with Sary prior to the dry season offensive of 1971-1972, and was with another RGNU delegation in Hanoi before the 1970-71 offensive. Hanoi gave more attention to Sary's visit in November 1971 than to his current stay, but he was paying an official visit then, rather than merely passing through.

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BACKGROUND While initial announcements on formation of the Front and the RGNU in the spring of 1970 gave only passing attention to Samphan and his two leading colleagues in the interior, Hou Youn and Hu Nim, since then their public stature--particularly that of Samphan--has grown in step with the gradual expansion of the Cambodian "liberated zone." Thus, Sihanouk acknowledged in an official pronouncement on 12 May 1970 that the three leaders were playing the chief role in the fighting in the interior, while a FUNK Central Committee meeting in August 1970 announced that Khieu Samphan had been elevated to RGNU Vice Premier, concurrent with his post of defense minister. The ministers' autonomy in Cambodia was underscored by AKI coverage in March 1971 of a report by Samphan at a conference of "members of the RGNU responsible for the interior" that dealt with varied fields of activity in Cambodia. On 3 June 1971 Penn Nouth added to Samphan's standing by formally announcing his appointment as "commander in chief" of the CPNLAF. A 20 August 1971 RGNU communique marking Ieng Sary's arrival in Peking reported that the envoy had delivered a message to Sihanouk from those with "responsibility" for the struggle in the interior "under the leadership of Khieu Samphan." More recently, Sihanouk acknowledged the interior ministers' rule over affairs in Cambodia, and his own delegation to a "mission abroad," in speeches during and after his tour of the liberated zone this spring. Subsequently, Front pronouncement on the landmark "national congress" held in Cambodia on 19-21 July, which set forth future goals of the Front's struggle, indicated that the congress had been dominated by Samphan and gave no indication there was any participation by Sihanouk's group in Peking.

**CAMBODIAN ANNIVERSARY
OBSERVANCE, MESSAGES**

The usual RGNU statement marking the Cambodian independence anniversary--this year issued in the form of an

8 November message by Prime Minister Penn Nouth--focused on the coming dry season offensive. It echoed recent Front comment that the struggle is entering "the decisive phase" and "advancing towards complete victory," reaffirmed an uncompromising settlement stance, and warned specifically against maneuvers by "Nixon and Kissinger," who were portrayed as being in "utter distress" over the Cambodian situation. The message seemed to allude to the imminent RGNU ministry shift in noting that the Front should accompany its "more crushing offensives in the 1973-74 dry season" with "all necessary preparations for the forthcoming complete liberation of our country."

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Reflecting the absence of Sihanouk and Penn Nouth from Peking, there was no repeat of previous years' gatherings in the Chinese capital which had occasioned a speech by Penn Nouth last year and speeches by Sihanouk and Chou En-lai in 1971 and 1970. The usual Chinese leaders' message dated 8 November was specifically addressed to Sihanouk and Penn Nouth in "Canton." Both the message and the 9 November PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial reaffirmed Chinese support for Sihanouk as "head of state" and criticized the "traitorous Lon Nol clique," but they softened last year's criticism of the United States and played down Chinese support for the Cambodian struggle. Notably, last year's message had cited Mao's promise of "powerful backing" and pledged to give "all out support and assistance," while this year's greetings merely offered to "firmly support" the struggle. Underlining Chinese discretion, NCNA's carefully edited replay of Penn Nouth's 8 November message dropped his criticism of compromise maneuvers by President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. Last year NCNA provided the text of the RGNU anniversary statement.

A more marked reduction of support was evident in the DRV leaders' message to "head of state" Sihanouk. Unlike last year, the Vietnamese did not refer to Sihanouk as the "representative of the legality, legitimacy, and continuity of the Cambodian state," dropped criticism of the Phnom Penh leaders by name, sidestepped support for Sihanouk's five points, and failed to endorse the RGNU directly as the sole legal and legitimate government of Cambodia. (The Joint DRV-LPF statement of 6 November marking Le Duan's recent tour of Laos duly restated DRV support for the RGNU and the five points, while criticizing the "Lon Nol clique of traitors.")

Moscow did not take note of the Cambodian anniversary, but did report the communique on the transfer of the RGNU ministries to the interior in a brief 12 November TASS report. PRAVDA on the 9th carried a notably warm message from Sihanouk and Penn Nouth to Soviet leaders on the anniversary of the October Revolution, expressing "deep gratitude" for Moscow's "resolute support" for the Front as well as for Soviet recognition of Sihanouk and the RGNU. Peking, meanwhile, finally took note indirectly of the changed Sihanouk-Moscow relationship, noting an NCNA 7 November report that Soviet Ambassador Tolstikov's reception on the October Revolution anniversary was attended by the RGNU foreign minister.

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LE DUAN LEADS FIRST PARTY-GOVERNMENT VISIT TO LAOS

Hanoi's backing for the Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) was graphically reinforced by the 2 to 6 November visit to Laos by a DRV delegation led by VWP First Secretary Le Duan. This was the first such high-level DRV delegation to visit Sam Neua, the LPF headquarters in northeastern Laos, although LPF leaders have journeyed to Hanoi on several occasions in the past. Reports on the trip do not reveal whether its timing was related to developments in Indochina, such as the stepped-up fighting in South Vietnam, the predicted Cambodian dry season offensive, or the delays in implementing provisions of the agreements between the LPF and the Royal Lao Government (RLG). The visit had been anticipated as far back as April, when the joint communique on a Hanoi visit by LPF Standing Committee member Nouhak Phoumsavan noted the Vietnamese had accepted an invitation to send a delegation.

Le Duan's delegation included Secretariat member and Vice Premier Hoang Anh, Vice Minister of Defense Maj Gen Nguyen Don, and Maj Gen Nguyen Trong Vinh. Vinh, who was not identified by his military position in the communique, presumably has special responsibility for Lao affairs: He is not known to have been active in public since early 1960 except for appearances he made in Hanoi during an August 1972 visit by an LPF delegation headed by Nouhak.

The Le Duan visit was not reported in the media until 7 November, after his return to Hanoi, presumably for reasons of security. In the days following the announcement Hanoi and Lao media publicized the activities and speeches during the trip, and the concluding joint communique was publicized on the 10th. According to the communique, the two sides held talks on the situation in Vietnam and Laos and on the "solidarity and relations of fraternal cooperation" between the two peoples. The atmosphere of the talks was described in standard terms as one of "militant solidarity, fraternal friendship, and complete confidence." Both Hanoi and Pathet Lao radios indicated that the two sides "reached unanimous agreement on all the issues they raised." (This point was not included in either side's English-language news agency "text" of the communique. Since the language of the two English versions is nearly identical, it is likely that this omission occurred inadvertently in both news agency versions because they were using the same English translation.) Unanimity of views was similarly claimed in the DRV-Lao communique on Nouhak's visit last April and at the time of LPF Chairman Souphanouvong's last visit to Hanoi in May 1971.

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The communique lauded Vietnam's "wholehearted assistance" to Laos and noted that Vietnam had "accepted enormous sacrifices" in assisting the Lao struggle; but it was restrained in its anticipation of future support, pledging the Vietnamese to do their best to do a "modest share" with the LPF in reconstruction in Laos and the struggle to preserve a durable peace there. The two sides expressed strong support for the formation of the new government in Laos and Hanoi indicated readiness to establish relations with it. Hanoi's commitment to the Lao settlement was underlined in a passage pointing out that the independence and peace of Vietnam and Laos are "related" and that "for that reason both the Paris agreement on Vietnam and the Vientiane agreement on Laos must be scrupulously observed."

The Vietnamese side also reaffirmed that the DRV wants to have "at its western frontier a genuinely independent, peaceful, and neutral Laos." The LPF responded by defining the foreign policy stance it felt the new Provisional National Union Government should adopt. The LPF, which will head the foreign ministry in the new administration, said that the government should follow a line of peace and neutrality, "support all the efforts" of the DRV and the PNG to implement the Paris agreement, and "recognize" that two administrations exist in South Vietnam.

The two sides expressed gratitude to "the socialist countries" for their support but did not specifically mention the Soviet Union and China. This is a departure from such recognition specified in the joint communique signed in May 1971 when Souphanouvong visited Hanoi, but is in conformity with the communique issued after Nhouhak Phoumsavan's visit earlier this year.

HANOI COMMENT NHAN DAN editorials on the Le Duan visit, published on 8 and 11 November, particularly stressed the importance of solidarity between Vietnam and Laos. The editorial on the 8th maintained that the consolidation of Indochinese solidarity is the "one path to follow" and warned of the Nixon Doctrine's "tricks" to "divide and rule." Neither editorial discussed Cambodia in this context, although the editorial on the 11th may have had the Cambodian insurgents in mind when it expounded at length on the rewards from the "model relationship" of Laos and Vietnam. It hailed the "correct international lines" of the North Vietnamese party and the LPF and claimed that their solidarity demonstrates that combining "genuine patriotism" and internationalism is a source of strength.

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Published the day after Secretary Kissinger's arrival in Peking, the editorial on the 11th referred derisively to the U.S. role in the world. It warned that the Nixon Doctrine does not always show the "real nature of the U.S. imperialists" but "also operates behind the scene by wirepulling such Hitlerite-type bloody coups as the one in Chile, or playing such perfidious roles as pilgrims for peace or mediators, as in the case of the Middle East." The paper added that: "Under such circumstances, Vietnamese-Lao militant solidarity, with its exemplary purity, with the considerable effect it has exercised, and with the thoroughgoing revolutionary spirit it embodies, is filled with a historic epochal significance just like the victories of the two peoples for which it constitutes a decisive factor."

TRADITIONAL DRV CELEBRATIONS MARK SOVIET ANNIVERSARY

Hanoi observed the October Revolution anniversary in traditional fashion with a message of congratulations to the Soviet leaders, a "grand meeting," editorial comment, and the appearance of several North Vietnamese leaders at a Soviet embassy reception.

The turnout of DRV leaders at the Soviet embassy included Politburo members Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi--all of whom attended a similar reception last year, as had the absent Vo Nguyen Giap* and Tran Quoc Hoan. Also present this year were Hoang Van Hoan and Van Tien Dung, who had not attended the 1972 reception. As usual the reception speeches were delivered by Premier Pham Van Dong and the Soviet ambassador. VNA's summary of the remarks noted that Dong expressed gratitude for the USSR's "great and precious support and assistance," and that the ambassador reiterated Soviet support and "demanded a halt to all violations of the Paris agreement by the United States and the Saigon administration."

The anniversary message, signed by Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, Truong Chinh, and Pham Van Dong, for the most part followed the pattern of previous years. The message, like other anniversary comment, followed the pattern of Soviet media since the April CPSU plenum in singling out Brezhnev by name in a passage on the Soviet people's endeavors under the leadership of the party

* Giap has not been reported at a public function since 6 October--see discussion in TRENDS of 31 October, pages 24-25.

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and its Central Committee "headed by Comrade L.I. Brezhnev." This treatment of Brezhnev accords with that during the July visit to the Soviet Union by a DRV delegation led by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong.

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ESTONIAN PROPOSES ALTERNATIVE FARM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

A prominent Estonian economist has proposed that Estonia be allowed to test a new system of managing kolkhozes and sovkhoses jointly through radically revamped rayon agriculture administrations-- a proposal running directly counter to current trends of agriculture administration. In advancing this proposal in the October QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS, M. Bronshteyn, head of the political economy chair at Tartu University, also explicitly challenged certain national programs and regional innovations that have recently gained prominence. Bronshteyn's proposal, despite its controversial nature, is consistent with the independent positions on agricultural matters held by Estonian party and government leaders for many years.

ESTONIAN PROPOSAL Bronshteyn proposed that management of both kolkhozes and sovkhoses be concentrated in rayon agriculture administrations and that the latter be converted from purely administrative bodies to production associations operating on principles of cost accounting. Since the production associations under Bronshteyn's proposal would be funded from the profits of participating farms, they would have a direct incentive to promote the most efficient methods of farming. The participating kolkhozes and sovkhoses would be represented in the associations by councils and would thus have a voice in the distribution of investment to backward farms and new agricultural complexes. Bronshteyn proposed that the new system of agricultural administration be initiated on an experimental basis in Estonia before its application on a broader scale. Estonia transferred its sovkhoses to cost accounting in 1967, and the success of this experiment led to nationwide adoption of the practice.

In justifying his proposal Bronshteyn condemned the trend toward separating kolkhozes and sovkhoses into mutually exclusive "closed" systems, arguing that this created obstacles to "bringing together and eventually combining" the two forms of property. As examples of "dangerous tendencies" in this regard, he pointed to the creation of rayon sovkhos trusts in Kazakhstan and kolkhoz councils and interkolkhoz processing plants in Moldavia.

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Bronshteyn criticized the current emphasis on reorganizing administration into specialized production associations and concentrating agricultural investments on the construction of large livestock complexes. He claimed that creation of separate associations for different agricultural branches led to duplication and complicated the tasks of agricultural coordination, and he maintained that territorial production associations would give Estonia and other localities better supervision over production than branch associations run from Moscow. He charged that concentrating investment on construction of a few large complexes neglected the interests of the majority of farms and served to retard agricultural progress.

In this connection, he argued that the proposed associations would facilitate solution of the explosive problem of balancing the divergent interests of rich and poor farms. While conceding that income redistribution within the associations would pose "serious difficulties," he pointed out that farms would find it more palatable to share their profits if decisions on this matter were made at the local level with participation by farm representatives.

BACKGROUND Bronshteyn's proposal reflects Estonia's longtime insistence on joint management of kolkhozes and sovkhoses by rayon agriculture administrations under a strong agriculture ministry and clearly runs against the current trend toward separate administrative systems for kolkhozes and sovkhoses and a proliferation of specialized farm organizations. A major step in this direction was taken in 1972 with the creation of an USSR Ministry of Sovkhoses comprising republic-wide branch associations and specialized administrations--for poultry, pigs, fruit, etc.--and specialized sovkhos trusts. The new minister for sovkhoses, I. P. Volovchenko, defended the reorganization in the September 1973 ECONOMICS OF AGRICULTURE on grounds that "experience has shown" that agricultural problems often cannot be resolved within territorial boundaries and "life insistently requires their resolution by branch."

The first move toward establishing a parallel kolkhoz system of administration occurred in early 1973, when Moldavia was granted permission to transfer kolkhozes from the Agriculture Ministry to an independent system of elective kolkhoz councils.* The

* For background, see TRENDS of 14 March 1973, pp 25-26.

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Estonians have long opposed this idea, and Estonian First Secretary I. G. Kebin was noticeably cool toward the Moldavian experiment during a visit to that republic last summer.*

Bronshteyn's complaint against "excessive concentration" of investments in large livestock complexes also conflicts with a national program. The program was pioneered in Belgorod oblast in the mid-1960's and was widely publicized in early 1971, when Belgorod First Secretary N. F. Vasilyev was promoted to RSFSR First Deputy Premier. Estonian First Deputy Premier E. G. Tynurist criticized the practice of concentrating on big livestock complexes as economically wasteful in the 10 April 1970 IZVESTIYA and again in the 16 December 1971 PRAVDA--before and after the Belgorod program gained acceptance in Moscow. According to Bronshteyn, Estonia has built only "a small number of very large experimental complexes" and has concentrated instead on building medium-sized complexes and on remodeling old livestock farms--an approach which he claims makes industrialization cheaper and available to a larger number of farms.

* For an analysis of Kebin's reaction, see TRENDS of 15 August 1973, pp. 20-21.

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON U.S. TRADE: Moscow continues to project optimism about the prospects for U.S.-Soviet economic cooperation. There has been no followup to the momentary doubt implied in the 3 November IZVESTIYA by commentator Matveyev, who questioned the Administration's motives in delaying its request for most-favored-nation status for the USSR. The media in recent days have reported growing interest in U.S. business circles in trade with Moscow. TASS on 13 November reported Assistant Secretary of Commerce Henry Turner's remarks in Moscow that "the United States Government is sincerely interested in the development of trade with the Soviet Union." The media have ignored the President's announced goal, in his 7 November energy message, of self-sufficiency in energy resources by 1980, and have continued to depict strong interest in the United States in cooperating to develop Soviet oil and gas deposits.

PEKING ON SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS: In the aftermath of Prime Minister Tanaka's talks in Moscow last month, Peking has begun to explicitly portray the Soviet threat to China as a danger to Japan. Adding to its regular warnings of the serious military threat Japan faces because of Soviet naval and air activities around Japan, Peking is now warning that Soviet troops on the Chinese border threaten Japan. Using selective quotes from the Japanese press, NCNA on 14 October lashed out at the Soviet Union for occupying the four northern islands and for "amassing a huge army along the frontier with China." Sharpening this image, NCNA on 8 November focused on remarks by one speaker at an anti-Soviet rally held in Tokyo to assert that the stationing of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border "is not only a threat to China but also a great threat to Japan." Peking has not originated any comment of its own on Tanaka's Moscow visit, confining its coverage to carefully selected pickups of Japanese news reports to develop the argument that no progress was made on the return of the four Soviet-held northern islands or on the conclusion of a Japan-Soviet peace treaty. A 22 October NCNA report on Foreign Minister Ohira's 11 October press conference, for example,

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only quoted Ohira's expression of regret that the summit meeting failed to produce a final settlement on return of the islands. NCNA omitted a portion of Ohira's statement, widely quoted in the Japanese press, which noted that Japan did succeed in persuading the Soviet Union to sit at the negotiation table to thrash out the territorial dispute.

PRC LANGUAGE REFORM: For the first time since the cultural revolution, the possibility of reforming the Chinese written language through the adoption of Latin characters has been openly raised by Peking. A 5 November NCNA article relating the success of the new Latinized Uighur and Kazakh written scripts noted that the "Latin alphabet is the most popular in the world" and stated that "the reform of the Han (Chinese) language is based on the Latin alphabet." During the cultural revolution's rejection of things foreign, all mention of language reform was dropped. Even after language reform regained respectability, the use of Latin characters has been treated gingerly. There have been a number of Sinkiang broadcasts on the new written Uighur and Kazakh scripts over the past two years, but none has mentioned that Latin characters are being used. The central KWANGMING DAILY restored its column on language reform on 9 May this year, but its introductory article avoided specifically mentioning the adoption of a Latin alphabetical system.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 5 - 11 NOVEMBER 1973

Moscow (2202 items)

October Revolution Anniversary	(2%)	39%
[Kirilenko Speech]	(--)	5%]
[Grechko Speech]	(--)	5%]
World Peace Congress in Moscow, 25-31 Oct.	(40%)	13%
Middle East	(6%)	4%
China	(3%)	4%
Brezhnev Meeting With Iraqi CP Leader	(--)	3%

Peking (1129 items)

Domestic Issues	(39%)	37%
Sierra Leone President in PRC	(--)	16%
Cambodia [20th Anniversary of Independence]	(3%)	14%
	(--)	8%]
Middle East	(21%)	7%
Kissinger in PRC	(--)	2%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.